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Abstract Wireless communication relies on access to the radiocommunica-
tions spectrum. A series of high-priced spectrum auctions has indicated that
there is a scarcity or an inefficient use of spectrum resources. This paper
presents an Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) model designed to
study the secondary use spectrum market, which improves spectrum usage by
allowing incumbent spectrum users to lease unused portions of their assigned
spectrum to third parties who could put them to a better use. In this paper, we
are particularly interested in the conditions under which such a market is likely
to emerge.
Keywords Spectrum management · Agent · Secondary market
1 Introduction
Innovative wireless communications services are among the most cutting edge
technologies. During the past decade, the wireless communications industry
has grown by orders of magnitude due to technological advances that allow
widespread deployment and smaller, more reliable, and more affordable
equipment. This explosive growth has stimulated the demand for access to
spectrum and has consequently driven regulatory bodies and researchers to
look into a more effective use of the radiocommunications spectrum.
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Measurement studies of the spectrum use in the FCC’s Spectrum Policy
Task Force (SPTF) report indicate that portions of spectrum are not in use
in many geographical areas for significant periods of time [2]. In response
to this, the FCC has taken steps to facilitate the development of markets
for spectrum usage rights to permit spectrum to flow freely among users in
response to economic demand [3]. These markets would allow incumbent
spectrum users to lease unused portions of their assigned spectrum to third
parties who could put them to better use. Leese et al. show that these kinds
of trades enhance productive efficiency [8]. If a trade can be conducted
with transparency and accountability, spectrum trading may impose a clear,
market-based opportunity cost upon incumbents, thereby providing them with
incentives to conserve spectrum. In the long run, the development of secondary
markets includes a market for license trading and one for temporary access of
existing licensed spectrum.
Spectrum trading as well as secondary use of spectrum raises numerous
technical, institutional, economic, and strategic issues that merit investigation,
many of which have been addressed in the literature [5, 6, 8, 10, 15]. These
researchers have built technical, economic and techno-economic models to
analyze questions related to spectrum commons and spectrum reuse using
economic, game and auction theory. These papers have produced impres-
sive theoretical results that provide significant advice to policymakers (for
example, Rodriguez and Jondral show that Ultra-Wideband (UWB) Per-
sonal Area Networks (PANs) create no economic loss to incumbent carriers
[15]).
This paper focuses on the secondary use of spectrum, defined as a temporal
use of licensed spectrum owned by an incumbent who is distinct from the
(temporary) spectrum user. We wish to extend previous work in this area
to domains where agents have uncertainties about market demand, are only
boundedly rational, and may act opportunistically. Thus, our approach has
been to focus on the effects of the transaction costs that ensue under these con-
ditions and the uncertainties due to potential interference [23–25]. In taking
the transaction cost approach, we assert that the transaction costs associated
with the market mechanism must be sufficiently low for secondary use to
become practical. We expect that the adoption of secondary spectrum use will
depend on technical factors (such as types of wireless services, coverage, and
application requirements) and economic factors (such as number of market
participants and price setting). In addition, different forms of secondary
use (e.g., spot markets, long-term lease, Mobile Virtual Network Operator
(MVNO), and others) are potentially suitable in some environments and for
some wireless services but not in others.
The Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) framework has proven to be useful
for studying the relationship between the characteristics of transactions and
the suitable organizational forms for carrying them out. Instead of explicitly
measuring transaction costs (which is quite difficult), TCE analyses assume
that agents seek to minimize these costs by adopting various organizational
forms. TCE identifies markets and firms (hierarchy) as two polar forms in
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which a transaction between buyer and supplier can take place [16]. Between
these two extremes, several intermediate forms exist including different types
of contractual arrangements, alliances, and joint ventures. These intermediate
forms are categorized as hybrid forms and they produce the positive features
of markets and hierarchy while reducing the negative aspects of both. The
preferred choice of organizational form depends on a comparison of the
transaction costs under each alternative. TCE provides a framework to assess
the strengths and weaknesses of each organizational form under different
scenarios through the analysis of transaction characteristics and the behaviors
of economic agents. Empirical studies demonstrate that a number of economic
activities across various industries are generally aligned with the TCE frame-
work [1, 17, 19].
Like Grandblaise et al. [5], we seek to explicitly associate technical parame-
ters and economic effects. Because we seek to incorporate only boundedly ra-
tional agents, we use Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) as a tool
to model the development of transactions in secondary spectrum use rather
than analytical techniques. ACE is the computational study of economies
modeled as dynamic systems of autonomous interacting agents [22]. The merits
of ACE are often compared to the mainstream, neoclassical approach in
economics. With neoclassical analysis, economic agents are typically assumed
to be homogeneous and fully rational. The goal is largely to derive analytic
closed-form solutions (i.e., equilibria) of an economic system. Accordingly,
ACE researchers often argue that this conventional analysis is a top-down and
deductive approach. For tractibility, neoclassical analyses tend to represent,
simplified, stylized settings of the economic system. In contrast, ACE works
from the bottom up by creating adaptive, heterogeneous, and autonomous
agents who interact with one another in dynamic environments. The goal of
ACE is not to derive closed-form solutions, but rather to observe and study
the aggregate outcomes and the norms of behavior that are developed and
sustained over time.
Applying these ideas to spectrum, we can see that, at present, there are
two main methods to obtain spectrum access: (1) use the unlicensed spectrum
band and (2) acquire an exclusive spectrum license. The focus of this paper is
to examine what happens when the secondary use of spectrum is introduced
as a new option for spectrum access. Secondary use can allow a portion of
spectrum users who cannot afford an exclusive license to become secondary
users. In particular, we are interested in how user and provider agents change
their spectrum access and use options under a variety of scenarios.
The purpose of this paper is to present our ACE model for studying
secondary use and to present the initial results from that model. In Section 2,
we review the agent-based spectrum access model and discuss the model
implementation with descriptions of spectrum access transactions, agents,
environments, and the model’s relationship to the TCE framework. Then,
Section 3 describes several experiments and presents and discusses the results.
Finally, in Section 4, we draw general conclusions and discuss future directions
for this research.
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2 An agent-based model for secondary use of radio spectrum
This section introduces a discrete-time agent-based economic model for spec-
trum access, which is described in more detail in [26]. We use the Recursive
Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit (Repast) as an agent modeling toolkit [12].
The model consists of two types of economic agents: spectrum access con-
sumers and spectrum access providers. A spectrum access consumer is a new
spectrum user who is seeking to obtain spectrum access and so is a potential
secondary user. A spectrum access provider is a spectrum license holder. The
provider may become a primary user if s/he allows secondary use by leasing
portions of spectrum to the consumer. Our goal is to explore the emerging
behavior among agents when the secondary use of spectrum is introduced as
an additional method to obtain spectrum access. More specifically, we focus
on the questions of when and why consumers would choose secondary use
of spectrum and in what form. This study involves identifying processes or
scenarios that leads to outcomes through the repeated interactions of these
autonomous agents.
2.1 Structure of spectrum access transactions
Transaction cost economics is used to identify the organizational forms in
which spectrum access transactions can take place. TCE identifies two be-
haviors underlying the existence of transaction costs: bounded rationality
and opportunism. These behaviors are used by TCE to explain the decisions
made by trading partners about the choice of organizational forms for the
transactions.
In order to gain insight into the effects of transaction costs on the struc-
ture of spectrum access transactions, our model incorporates both of these
behaviors into the agents. In the case of bounded rationality, consumer and
provider agents are subject to several kinds of limitations. Agents do not have
complete information about the environment in which they operate. Each
provider does not have access to consumer preferences and their potential
opportunistic behaviors. Similarly, each consumer does not have information
about the behaviors of providers or other consumers. An agent must observe
the outcomes of the transactions, learn from the interactions, and adapt its
action to the dynamic environment. In addition, agents have limited processing
capacity, which is implemented by using a reinforcement learning algorithm
(described in more detail in Section 2.3) which has minimal complexity.
Opportunistic behavior can take many forms. In this paper, we focus on the
impact of interference (i.e., wireless signal interference) on both consumers
and providers. To model this, we allow provider agents to overstate supply
quantities (with a certain probability); i.e., they sometimes lease spectrum
that could create interference with other consumers in order to generate
more revenue. Likewise, consumers also have the potential to understate their
demand quantities; i.e., specify less spectrum than what they actually need in
order to reduce cost. It should be noted that overstating the supply might not
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Fig. 1 Governance structures in secondary use of radio spectrum
always be the best strategy for providers. Depending on the price elasticity
of consumers and the characteristics of the market, providers may instead
understate their supply quantities in order to generate a higher market price.
Understating the supply quantities, however, will not create interference for
consumers. The implementation of opportunism in the agent-based model is
further explained in Section 2.4.
Given the absence of widespread secondary use in practice, it is not clear
how exactly the spectrum sharing via secondary use will take place. We expect
that different forms of secondary use could affect the magnitude of the trans-
action costs and the level of uncertainty due to potential interference. These
different forms of secondary use map to different choices of organizational
form on the market-hierarchy continuum under the TCE framework. In the
context of secondary use, an organizational form toward the market side
implies a real-time spot spectrum market (or sharing formations of similar
configuration), whereas the hierarchy side suggests formations similar to a
MVNO.
We use degree of control as a common indicator to differentiate multiple
forms of economic organization that can be used for organizing spectrum
access transactions. Degree of control refers to the ability of the organizational
form to contain opportunistic behaviors and to facilitate the compatibility of
actions among transacting agents. As suggested by TCE [29], Fig. 1 illustrates
that markets have a relatively low value for degree of control, hybrid forms
possess intermediate values, and firms (hierarchy) have a relatively high value
for degree of control.
Considering opportunistic behaviors and coordination capabilities in terms
of their interference effects, using degree of control as an indicator allows us to
incorporate traditional methods of spectrum access, namely unlicensed spec-
trum and exclusive license. Unlicensed spectrum does not provide interference
protection, nor does it facilitate the coordination among unlicensed users.
Harmful interference between unlicensed users or the tragedy of the commons
that could render unlicensed spectrum unusable may occur.1 Therefore, it
has lower degree of control when compared to markets. On the other hand,
1We do not consider mesh networking scenarios as do Levine et al., so we see no capacity increases
as the number of users increase [10].
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a spectrum license gives a licensee exclusive access and a full interference
protection. Thus, a license yields a higher degree of control than hierarchy.
2.2 Agent descriptions
Agents are autonomous entities capable of encapsulating their own data and
behavioral methods. An agent’s data may include its current inventory, the
current market price, its utility function, etc., while the agent’s behavioral
methods include market protocols, pricing strategies, learning algorithms,
etc. Some of the methods and data, such as protocols and price, can be
publicly accessible, whereas others, such as inventory and strategies, should
be contained within an agent. Agents also have communication capability and
continuously exchange information with each other to achieve their own goals.
An agent in the spectrum access model is denoted as a spectrum user who
utilizes the radio spectrum to provide a wireless service and/or application.
Spectrum users are characterized by their spectrum needs, which in turn are
influenced by their application requirements and network configurations. We
adopt a utility-based approach to provide a unified framework for different
spectrum-based applications and for spectrum users with different priority
levels. Specifically, each spectrum user maintains its utility function as a
perceived value (utility) of the received Quality of Service (QoS) of wireless
transmission. We assume that the QoS depends on the received Signal to
Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR). We model the data rate as an increas-
ing function of the received SINR. Different users may have different utilities
from the same QoS, depending on their individual services and applications.
Thus, various service requirements can be embedded in each user’s utility
function.
The communications system of each spectrum user is represented by a set
of transmitters and receivers that belong to that user. Obviously, the direction
of communications is from the transmitter to the receiver. Casting (e.g., uni-
cast, multi-cast, and broadcast) is achieved by defining the pair or connectivity
between transmitter(s) and receiver(s).
Spectrum users are further classified into two subclasses: consumer agents
and provider agents. Consumer agents are spectrum users who are seeking
spectrum access. Provider agents are spectrum users who hold exclusive spec-
trum licenses; hence they are the potential primary users. The remainder of this
section describes the details of the consumer and provider agents, respectively.
Consumer agents are spectrum users who are actively seeking spectrum
access but do not currently hold a spectrum license. Thus, they are the potential
secondary spectrum users and are buyers in the market. As discussed in
Section 2.1, we use degree of control (d) to identify the suitable organizational
form(s) for a potential spectrum access transaction. Following Fig. 1, we
assign values of degree of control so that consumers using the unlicensed
spectrum will derive a degree of control of zero and those using the exclusive
license will acquire a degree of control of one. It should be noted that these
degree of control values should be interpreted as ordinal measures only as
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the objective here is to convey the relative ranking of different organizational
forms. Consumer agents have three main methods to obtain spectrum access
as follows:
• Unlicensed spectrum: When using unlicensed spectrum (dc = 0.0),2 a con-
sumer agent randomly selects an operating frequency inside the unlicensed
spectrum band at every time step of the model’s execution. This imple-
mentation is similar to the frequency hopping technique currently used
in the unlicensed band. It also implies that the consumer agent is free to
select other spectrum access options as soon as the current time step ends.
The price for using unlicensed spectrum is zero. The consumer, however, is
taking the risk of being interfered with by other unlicensed spectrum users.
• Secondary use: If a consumer agent selects secondary use (0.0 < dc < 1.0),
the dc value will represent the degree of control selected by the consumer.
The provider must agree to the selected degree of control to be eligible
for a transaction with this consumer. Therefore, consumer’s dc choice
can control the outcome of the economic organization that will be used
to organize the current spectrum access transaction. With the chosen
value of dc, the consumer agent will announce a spectrum access bid at
period t (which is a time step in the model’s execution) that includes
the following information: the amount of spectrum (Mtotalc ), the degree
of control (dc,t), the access duration (lc,t), and the bid price (pbidc,t ). The
buying bids of consumer agents and selling offers from provider agents will
enter a competitive bidding process (see Section 2.5). We assume that the
provider can arrange secondary access without interference over the entire
simulation area. We also assume that the consumer pays an additional fixed
cost that increases linearly with dc for every secondary use transaction.
• Exclusive license: When selecting an exclusive license (dc = 1.0), the con-
sumer pays the license fee. The consumer agent is locked in and cannot
select other spectrum access choices until the license expires.3 We assume
that when the consumer agent exercises the exclusive license option, s/he
can expect an interference-free operation over the entire simulation area.
Given this array of choices for obtaining spectrum access, each consumer
agent explores spectrum access options by repeatedly choosing among several
combinations of {degree of control, access duration} or {dc, lc} to satisfy his/her
spectrum demand. For each spectrum transaction, the received utility (u) is
2dc and dp denote consumer’s and provider’s choices of degree of control, respectively.
3More generally, this is the cost of a technological alternative to secondary or unlicensed use,
which could include wireline technology or the use of frequencies in a different band. In the
more general case, license expiration can be taken to be the time in which the investment in the
alternative technology is depreciated. The generalization of license cost should also include those
costs associated with switching technologies.
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the minimum received utility of all receivers of that consumer. Then, each
consumer j calculates a surplus value (s j,t) that s/he received as a function of
the received utility (u j,t) and the cost of spectrum access (c j,t):
s j,t = αu, ju j,t − αc, jc j,t (1)
where αu, j and αc, j are the QoS sensitivity and the cost sensitivity of consumer
j, respectively. The objective of the consumer is commonly assumed to maxi-
mize his/her surplus [27]. Accordingly, consumers use a learning algorithm to
adapt their preferences on dc j,t and lc j,t based on the received surplus (s j,t) from
each transaction. The price update of the consumer’s bid (pbidc j,t) is discussed in
Section 2.5.
Providers in the spectrum access model are spectrum users who currently
own exclusive spectrum licenses. Therefore, they are the potential primary
spectrum users and are sellers in the spectrum market. Similar to consumer
agents, the provider agents’ spectrum utilization is characterized by their
application requirements and network configurations. We assume that the
operating frequency of transmitters and receivers is within the bounds of the
provider’s spectrum license. The providers can sublease unused parts of their
spectrum in terms of the number of BBUs and lease durations specified in
consumer’s spectrum access bids, subject to availability.4
Each provider agent selects a degree of control (dp), which will represent
the minimum threshold that is acceptable for the provider. The consumer must
have an adequate degree of control (dc ≥ dp) to be eligible for a transaction
with this provider. Therefore, the choice of dp controls the outcome of organi-
zation that will be used to manage this spectrum transaction. The range of dp is
between 0.0 and 1.0 as before, but the interpretation differs. For a transaction
to take place, the minimum value of dp must be equal to the minimum value
of dc. When a provider selects this minimum value, s/he indicates a willingness
to conduct a transaction with any qualifying consumer agent. The maximum
value of dp is 1.0, which gives the provider an option not to participate in
secondary use. This implementation is feasible because the maximum value
of dc for secondary use is always less than 1.0. With the selected value of
dp, the provider agent will announce a spectrum access offer at period t that
includes the following information: the amount of shared spectrum (Msharep,t ),
the minimum degree of control (dp,t), the maximum lease duration (l p,t), the
frequency channel ( fp,t), and the ask price (paskp,t ).
The values of Msharep,t , l p,t, and fp,t may vary in each model time step
depending on the characteristics of the provider’s spectrum usage and the
ongoing secondary use transactions. The offers from providers and the bids
from consumers enter a competitive bidding process (see Section 2.5). The
4Thus, we implicitly assume that the provider uses some form of Frequency Division Multiple
Access (FDMA) technology without loss of generality. We could imagine similar markets for time
slots or noise levels in the case of Time- and Code- Division Multiple Access (i.e., TDMA and
CDMA, respectively).
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outcome will determine the transaction partner (consumer), the secondary use
price (i.e., revenue from secondary use), and the organizational form (d) of
the secondary use transaction. This information will be used by the provider to
update the availability of spectrum in the subsequent offers.
With an array of degree of control choices, each provider agent repeatedly
samples different dp choices to find the best option for the current scenario.
For each transaction, the provider calculates the received utility (u), which
is the minimum received utility of all of the provider’s receivers. Then, each
provider k uses the received utility (uk,t), the exclusive license fee (Clicense),
and the secondary use revenue to compute the surplus value (sk,t):
sk,t = αu,kuk,t − αc,kClicense + revenue (2)
where αu,k and αc,k are the QoS sensitivity and the cost sensitivity of provider
k, respectively. Similar to consumer agents, the objective of providers is to
maximize his/her surplus [27]. Accordingly, providers use a learning algorithm
to adapt their preferences on dpk,t based on the received surplus (sk,t) from
each transaction. The price update of provider’s offer (paskpk,t) is discussed in
Section 2.5.
2.3 Learning algorithms
Given the outcome of a transaction, both the consumer and provider agents
adapt their future actions to maximize their own objectives (utilities). One of
the popular learning algorithms used to capture the natural learning process
of human and organization is reinforcement learning. The underlying concept
of reinforcement learning is that the propensity to take any particular action
should be increased or reinforced if it produces favorable outcomes and
decreased if it leads to negative results [21]. The algorithm is decentralized and
only requires information about an agent’s past actions and the corresponding
payoffs. The advantage of reinforcement learning is in its simplicity; it does
not require high-level processing capabilities from the agent. Since reinforce-
ment learning is relatively naive (in that it only uses local information), it is
consistent with the notion of bounded rationality in TCE.
We implement a variation on this approach, called the reinforcement
comparison method, which establishes a reference level of result (reference
reward) and uses this reference value to evaluate the outcome of future
transactions. The reinforcement comparison method maintains the propensity
or preference for each action and uses the propensity values to calculate the
probability that particular action will be chosen in the next transaction.
In the case of consumer agents, the action is the selection of {dc ∈ Dc, lc ∈
Lc}. The probability of consumer j selecting any dc and lc at period t1 according
to the softmax action selection rules is:
ρc j,t1(dc, lc) =
exp
[
qc j,t1(dc, lc)
]
∑
a∈Dc,b∈Lc
exp
[
qc j,t1(a, b)
] (3)
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The consumer obtains spectrum access based on the values of {dc j,t1 , lc j,t1 }
selected from this probability distribution. For example, if we assume that
the transaction (i.e., unlicensed, secondary use, or exclusive license access)
concludes at period t2, the propensity of selecting dc j,t1 and lc j,t1 is updated by
the difference between the received surplus (s j,t2 ) and the reference surplus
(srj,t1 ):
qc j,t2(dc j,t1 , lc j,t1) = qc j,t1(dc j,t1 , lc j,t1) + βsc(s j,t2 − srj,t1) (4)
Because of this update, the probability of selecting the same action on the
next transaction will be increased if the received surplus is higher than the
reference value, and decreased if the received surplus is lower. This adjustment
is controlled by the step-size parameter βsc.
After the propensity update in Eq. 4, the reference surplus is updated to
include the received surplus (s j,t2 ). Instead of taking an average of all past
surpluses as a new reference value, we weight the recent surpluses more heav-
ily than the older ones. This exponential, recency-weighted average method
is appropriate for a non-stationary environment [21]. The reference surplus
update is as follows:
srj,t2 = srj,t1 + αsc(s j,t2 − srj,t1) (5)
Here, αsc is the step-size parameter that controls the weight of the reference
surplus update.
In addition to this learning process, we want to make sure that consumer
agents explore the whole {dc, lc} space and do not bind to certain solutions.
We add a stochastic element into the model by assigning a small probability,
δc j , that consumer j will not follow the probability distribution ρc j,t(dc, lc) as
suggested by the reinforcement learning in Eq. 3. Instead, consumer j will
randomly select {dc, lc} choices (i.e., using the uniform distribution):
ρc j,t(dc, lc) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
exp
[
qc j,t(dc,lc)
]
∑
a∈Dc ,b∈Lc exp
[
qc j,t(a,b)
] with probability 1 − δc j
1
Total number of choices with probability δc j
(6)
The learning process of provider agents is the selection of degree of control
value (dp ∈ Dp) to control the organization of the spectrum access transaction.
The process follows the reinforcement comparison method similar to the one
we described for consumer agents.
2.4 Opportunistic behavior modeling
Transaction costs emerge because transacting partners have the potential to
behave opportunistically in order to gain an advantage in a trade. Here,
we focus on the impact on interference of opportunistic transactions. An
opportunistic consumer will understate the original demand quantity in order
to reduce secondary use cost. When announcing a spectrum access bid, the
original quantity Mtotalc will be replaced with the new quantity, M
total∗
c . The
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opportunistic consumer will operate in the provider’s spectrum in excess of
the quantity stated in the bid. Hence, the effect of a consumer’s opportunism
is potential interference to the provider’s receivers. To simplify the model, we
use Mtotal
∗
c = Mtotalc /2 for all opportunistic consumer agents.5
Opportunistic consumers can also learn from their opportunistic behaviors
in the current transaction and decide whether they should act opportunistically
in future transactions. We also use the reinforcement comparison method for
this learning process. Let the opportunistic choice of consumer j, oc j,t, be 0
when consumer j decides not to become an opportunist and 1 otherwise. The
probability that consumer j will act opportunistically at period t1 is:
ρc j,t1(1) =
exp
[
qc j,t1(1)
]
exp
[
qc j,t1(0)
] + exp [qc j,t1(1)
] (7)
For example, if we assume that, when the transaction concludes at period t2,
the propensity of making an opportunistic choice oc j,t1 in period t1 is updated
by the difference between the received profit (π j,t2 ) and the reference profit
(π rj,t1 ):
qc j,t2(oc j,t1) = qc j,t1(oc j,t1) + βoc(π j,t2 − π rj,t1) (8)
where βoc is the step-size parameter that controls the rate of propensity update.
The exponential, recency-weighted average method then is applied to the
reference profit update:
π rj,t2 = π rj,t1 + αoc(π j,t2 − π rj,t1) (9)
where αoc controls the update weight. The profit from opportunistic behavior
can be specified as follows:
• If consumer j does not act opportunistically (i.e., oc j,t1 = 0), there will be
no gain from this action. Thus, the received opportunistic profit upon the
ending of transaction is 0.0 (π j,t2 = 0.0).• If consumer j acts opportunistically (i.e., oc j,t1 = 1), the profit from this
action will be in the form of a reduced cost of the spectrum access
transaction. Thus, the received profit upon the ending of transaction, π j,t2 ,
is set to the difference between the spectrum access cost with quantity
Mtotalc and the spectrum access cost with quantity M
total∗
c .• If consumer j receives an interference complaint from his/her transacting
provider, it implies that the transacting provider is suffering interference
from one or more secondary use transactions. This situation will discour-
age the provider from participating in a secondary use transaction in the
future. As a consequence, consumer j may have to rely on an exclusive
license for spectrum access due to the limited availability of spectrum for
5Although we expect that opportunistic spectrum users would abuse the transaction with a small
probability (e.g., 0.10), we select an aggressive margin to intensify the effects of opportunistic
behavior in order to speed up the convergence of the agent-based model.
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secondary use. Thus, upon receiving the interference complaint, consumer
j will update the choice of acting opportunistically (i.e., oc j,t1 = 1) with the
received profit, π j,t2 , of negative exclusive license cost (−Clicense).
Consumers also react to the opportunistic behavior of provider agents. We
assume that a consumer agent can distinguish his/her transacting partners
and develop as well as maintain basic trust information on each of his/her
partners. Following Klos’s agent-based modeling of trust [7], trust is defined
as the ability to act according to expectation. In our case, consumer agents
expect secondary use of spectrum without interference. We further assume
that the consumer’s trust in a particular provider increases with the number
of consecutive transactions without interference when the consumer transacts
with that provider. The development of consumer’s trust is specified by the
following equation [7]:
trust = Tbase + (1 − Tbase)
(
1 − 1
xTF + 1 − TF
)
(10)
where Tbase is the base-level of trust; x is the number of consecutive transac-
tions without interference; and TF is a parameter that controls trust develop-
ment rate. From Eq. 10, the range of trust value is [0, 1]. We apply the following
rules to trust modeling: when consumer j experiences interference while using
the spectrum of provider k, consumer j’s trust in provider k is reduced by
half. If trust drops below Tthres, consumer j will transact with provider k with a
probability Tprob ; otherwise, consumer j will always transact with provider k.
If consumer j does not experience interference while transacting with provider
k, his/her trust in provider k starts to increase at the rate specified by Eq. 10.
An opportunistic provider will overstate the original supply quantity in
order to generate more revenue. In doing this, the opportunistic provider will
continue to announce a spectrum access offer even after all spectrum available
for secondary use has been leased to other consumers. The consumer who
transacts with this provider will operate in the frequencies that are being used
by other consumer agents. Therefore, the effect of the provider’s opportunism
is potential interference to the consumer’s receivers.
Opportunistic providers use reinforcement comparison to learn and max-
imize the profit from opportunistic behavior choices in a manner similar to
the consumer agents. The profit from a provider’s opportunistic behavior is
described as follows:
• If provider k does not act opportunistically (i.e., opk,t1 = 0), there will be no
gain. Thus, the received opportunistic profit upon the ending of transaction
is 0.0 (πk,t2 = 0.0).• If provider k acts opportunistically (i.e., opk,t1 = 1), the profit from this
action will be additional revenue from spectrum access offers in excess of
the provider’s truthful capacity. Thus, the received profit upon the ending
of transaction, πk,t2 , is the revenue of that opportunistic transaction.• Provider k’s spectrum offers may be rejected by a particular consumer,
which implies that the consumer’s trust in provider k is below Tthres because
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the consumer has encountered interference in a previous transaction with
provider k. With a low trust value, the consumer will avoid making sec-
ondary use transactions with provider k. As a result, provider k will receive
fewer transactions and, hence, less secondary use revenue. Therefore,
upon receiving a consumer’s rejection of the spectrum offer, provider k will
update the outcome of opportunistic behavior (i.e., opk,t1 ) with the received
profit, πk,t2 , equivalent to the negative revenue of the failed offer (i.e., the
opportunity cost).
Providers also react to the opportunistic behavior of consumer agents. Here,
providers expect an interference-free operation when they are sharing spec-
trum for secondary use. In contrast to the consumer’s opportunistic model
(where consumers maintain trust information on his/her partners), providers
do not implement the trust model because it is difficult and costly for providers
to identify the sources of interference (i.e., opportunistic consumers). This
is especially true when each provider can serve multiple spectrum access
consumers at the same time. Instead, provider k will issue an interference
complaint to all consumers who are operating in provider k’s spectrum as
soon as s/he experiences interference while allowing secondary use to these
consumers. In addition to this, provider k will choose the minimum degree of
control, dp, to limit the consumer’s opportunistic behavior. Effectively, this
removes spectrum from the secondary use market, which should have the
effect of increasing prices to consumers, ceteris paribus, and decreasing their
profits.
2.5 Spectrum leasing and pricing
We use an auction to determine the price of spectrum access transactions
between consumer and provider agents. The continuous double auction (CDA)
has been widely studied and is the dominant approach used in real-world
equities and derivatives trading. In CDA, bids and asks are publicly announced
and traded at any time during the trading period without relying on a central
auctioneer [4]. Experiments indicate that the CDA mechanism can produce
reliable price convergence close to theoretical equilibria [20]. In our agent-
based model, we follow a form of CDA, the persistent shout double auction
algorithm by Preist and Van Tol [13, 14]. In this auction, an agent may make
an offer to buy or an offer to sell at any time. The offer is, however, persistent
until the owner revises or removes it in response to other trading activities.
Once bids and asks are met, they are removed from the transaction system
and a trade takes place. Contracts between user and provider agents (as would
be used in today’s MVNO arrangements) are not within the range of choices
offered to agents in this model.
Our objective in using CDA is to determine the equilibrium price of
secondary use transactions given the current supply and demand for spectrum
access. Although the negotiation in CDA may result in trades taking place
at different prices and away from the equilibrium, several repetitions of the
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auction with the same bids and asks converge to the equilibrium price [14, 20].
Therefore, consumer and provider agents in the model will engage in a series
of mock auctions before the real auction takes place in the final round. These
mock auctions will allow agents to respond to market conditions and other
trading activities before holding the final auction. Hence, the final auction will
result in trades taking place closer to the equilibrium than a single auction [14].
Recall that our agent-based model for secondary use operates on a set
of conditions that includes degree of control, lease duration, and amount of
spectrum. These factors place constraints on secondary use transactions in
addition to the reservation price. Let R, D, L, and M denote reservation price,
degree of control, lease duration, and amount of spectrum, respectively. Also,
let bi and a j represent bid i and ask j, respectively. To determine the eligibility
of a consumer’s bids and a provider’s asks, the following conditions are tested:
• Reservation price: Rbi ≥ min j(Ra j) and Ra j ≤ maxi(Rbi)• Degree of control: Dbi ≥ min j(Da j) and Da j ≥ mini(Dbi)• Lease duration: Lbi ≤ max j(La j) and La j ≥ mini(Lbi)• Amount of spectrum: Mbi ≤ max j(Ma j) and Ma j ≥ mini(Mbi)
Each bid must have a least one ask that satisfies all four constraints to
be considered eligible (and vice versa). All ineligible bids and asks will be
removed from the auction process.6
In addition to the four constraints, a consumer agent may decline to transact
with a particular provider agent based on the their level of trust, as discussed
earlier. In this case, the transaction between these two agents will occur with a
probability Tprob , otherwise the provider’s ask will be removed.
The agent’s algorithm in the auction has minimal complexity. It consists
of simple heuristics and uses simple learning rules. Each agent i maintains a
profit margin, μi, which governs the buying/selling price relative to the agent’s
reservation price, Ri. The individual agent calculates the current price, pi, as
follows:
pi = Ri(1 + μi) (11)
For a provider agent, the price pi represents the minimum price at which
the provider will make a trade. The profit margin for providers must lie in
[0,∞). This implies that a provider’s margin can be raised by increasing μi
and lowered by decreasing μi. In the case of a consumer agent, the price pi
represents the maximum price at which the consumer is willing to pay. The
profit margin for consumers is in the range [−1, 0]. Therefore, a consumer’s
profit margin can be increased by decreasing μi and reduced by increasing μi.
Each agent begins with a random profit margin. The profit margin μi is
then adjusted dynamically in response to the actions of other agents and the
trading activities. If the agent sets the profit margin too low, it will not make
6Because there are four constraints to be matched, we assume that sufficient market thickness
exists. We will examine this assumption in future research.
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as much profit as it could. On the other hand, if the profit margin is too high,
it may be undercut by other agents and will not be able to secure a deal. The
decision to increase or decrease the profit margin is based on the objective of
maintaining a competitive bid/ask price compared to other agents. In order
to do this, an agent maintains a target price, τi (τi = Ri(1 + μi)), and follows
the simple heuristics: if trades are not taking place in the current trading
period, an agent should set its target to the most competitive bid/ask. Thus, the
target price should be slightly better than the agent’s competition. If, however,
trades are taking place, an agent should set its target to be slightly better (i.e.,
higher profit) than the best price that can result in a transaction. Here, the
agent anticipates that it could have asked even a higher profit and still secured
a deal.
In our model, τi denotes a target price, b max represents the highest bid, amin
the lowest ask in the current trading round, and r is a small random variable.
The following pseudocode summarizes the heuristic for consumer agents.
if amin > b max then
τi = (1 + r)b max
else
τi = (1 − r)amin
end if
The heuristic for provider agents is as follows:
if amin > b max then
τi = (1 − r)amin
else
τi = (1 + r)b max
end if
Following Preist and Van Tol [13, 14], we implement r as a random variable
uniformly distributed over the range [0, 0.2].
Agents who are not participating in an auction (i.e., they are successfully
engaged in a trade or they do not wish to participate at the current period) also
continuously observe the activities of other agents. In this case, they have little
or no incentive to lower their profit margins. However, if the trade activities
suggest that they could benefit from raising the profit margin, they would do
so. Thus, both active and inactive agents can increase their profit margins, but
only active agents can reduce their margin in response to the current condition.
With the target price τi, an agent adjusts his/her current price pi towards
the target using the Widrow-Hoff with momentum learning rule, which is
an adaptation algorithm used in back-propagation in neural networks [18].
The algorithm specifies two parameters: the learning rate coefficient β and
the momentum γ . Given the price pi(t) at time t, the price at time t + 1 is
given by:
pi(t + 1) = γ pi(t) + (1 − γ )β(τi(t) − pi(t)) (12)
Here, the price will move towards the target with the speed determined by
β. The momentum γ is used to reduce oscillation in the price adjustment. In
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our experiments, the values of β and γ are set to 0.3 and 0.05, respectively
[13, 14].
As we mention earlier, consumer and provider agents will participate in a
series of trading periods (i.e., mock auctions) and the real auction will take
place in the final period, when the price has stabilized. We fix the number of
mock auctions at 500 auctions.
3 Results and discussion
In all experiments, each spectrum user is represented by a wireless system
that consists of a set of wireless transmitters and receivers. We assume that
a consumer’s wireless system is a two-way infrastructure network that consists
of one base station and five wireless clients. In contrast, a provider’s wireless
system is modeled as a one-way infrastructure network, since we assume that
primary users (i.e., provider agents) share the spectrum of their downlink
channels. The default settings for the number of base stations (transmitters)
and clients (receivers) of provider agents are 0.5625 transmitter per sq. km
and ten receivers per transmitter, which represents a medium-level density
of transmitters and receivers. In both the consumer and provider cases, base
stations are randomly placed in the environment and wireless clients are
randomly positioned inside the coverage area of their base station. An example
configuration of a consumer’s wireless system is shown in Fig. 2. The locations
of the base stations and the wireless clients are also randomly changed in
every run.
Transceiver
Max. coverage
(a)
Consumer 1
Consumer 2
Consumer 3
(b)
Consumer 1
Consumer 2
Consumer 3
Fig. 2 Example of three consumer agents: a With small coverage area and b With large coverage
area
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Transmit power is calculated to provide reliable communications (i.e.,
satisfy receiver’s SINR requirement) for any receiver inside the transmit-
ter’s coverage area. The utility function of both consumers and providers is
defined as:
U(γ ) =
{
1 − exp (−(γ − γ ∗)/η) if γ ≥ γ ∗
0 otherwise
(13)
where γ is the received SINR, γ ∗ is the SINR threshold value, and η(> 0)
is the parameter that can be varied to obtain different levels of concavity
and correspondingly different levels of application requirements. To run the
simulation, we had to set the model’s parameters. For the kinds of questions we
chose to address, the model area had to be of a size to accommodate multiple
cells that could be made to overlap or not to overlap, based on the path loss
coefficient and the transmitter power. We chose to model the 1900 MHz band,
which is used for licensed 3G mobile services; this band is also close to the
unlicensed 2400 MHz band, so a single path loss exponent (set to 3.5) can
be used. An overall simulation area of 16 sq. km (i.e., a square 4 km on
each side) was of the appropriate size to contain several cells, whose radius
we vary in different experiments; Fig. 2 shows two different configurations of
the simulated system. Additionally, for the results reported in this paper, we
assume: that each spectrum user has a hard requirement on the received SINR
with γ ∗ = 15 dB and η = 0.001, that both the consumer’s and the provider’s
receivers have a sensitivity of 100 dBm, and that all spectrum users may
behave opportunistically. The results are presented as average values over
multiple runs.
3.1 Emergence of secondary use
The objective of this set of experiments is to study the behavior of consumer
agents in terms of their selections of degree of control (dc) in response to the
existence of secondary use, number of consumers in the environment (NC),
and spectrum access characteristics of consumer agents.
Thus, there are two scenarios in this set of experiments. The first scenario
examines the case where secondary use of spectrum is not permitted (which is
the current policy scenario). In this scenario, each consumer agent must either
use unlicensed spectrum or acquire an exclusive license in order to obtain
spectrum access. The second scenario presents the case where secondary use
is introduced, and consumers are allowed to choose intermediate values for
degree of control.
Figure 3 shows the percentage of spectrum access options for different
maximum coverage (Dmax) and QoS sensitivity (αu) of five consumer spectrum
users under the first scenario and the second scenario for three different
cell sizes. Since the secondary use option is not allowed in the first scenario,
spectrum access choices are limited to unlicensed spectrum and exclusive
licenses and the degree of control value for each consumer is either 0.0 or 1.0.
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Fig. 3 Percentage of spectrum access options for 5 consumers
In Fig. 3, all consumers operate in the unlicensed spectrum when cell sizes
are small (Dmax = 250m) and αu is 3.0. As the QoS sensitivity (αu) increases,
the negative effects of interference in the unlicensed band start to outweigh
the cost of an exclusive license. In other words, those consumers with stringent
QoS requirements have less tolerance for interference. As a result, some of
the consumer agents switch to exclusive licenses. The percentage of exclusive
license is, however, less than 10%.
This figure also shows an increasing use of exclusive licenses as the maxi-
mum coverage of each consumer cell increases. The larger coverage requires
a transmitter to increase its transmit power, producing higher interference
for other unlicensed spectrum users. At Dmax of 500 m, there is evidence of
exclusive license usage as early as αu of 3.0. As we increase αu, the effects
of larger coverage result in more than 35% and 40% of exclusive license use
for αu values of 6.0 and 9.0, respectively. The results continue to follow this
trend at Dmax of 1000 m. It should be noted that although the unlicensed band
can accommodate at least five consumers (U/Mtotalc = 50/10 = 5), the results
show that the exclusive license choice existed in most of the scenarios. Such an
outcome is not unexpected, considering that the unlicensed spectrum does not
facilitate any coordination among the unlicensed users. As a result, operating
frequencies of unlicensed users may overlap and create interference. These
interference effects can be so severe that some agents opt for exclusive licenses
even when the unlicensed band is not yet fully congested.
Figures 4 and 5 present the results where NC is 13 and 19, respectively. With
an increase in NC, the unlicensed spectrum gets congested more easily. The
figures show an increase in the number of consumers operating in the same
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area, which yields a higher use of exclusive licenses (as expected). With 13
consumer agents in Fig. 4, the use of exclusive licenses appears at all parameter
levels, starting from 4.62% (Dmax = 250, αu = 3.0) to the highest value of
99.74% (Dmax = 1000, αu = 9.0). These percentages are even higher when we
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Fig. 5 Percentage of spectrum access options for 19 consumers
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have 19 consumer agents (Fig. 5), ranging from 11.58% (Dmax = 250, αu = 3.0)
to 100% (Dmax = 1000, αu = 9.0).
When secondary use is included as an option (in the second scenario), the
role of provider agents (spectrum incumbents) comes into play. Each provider
holds an exclusive license and shares an unused amount of spectrum with
consumers for a period of time. We assume that the number of provider agents
is 19. The results of this scenario are displayed in the cross-hatch pattern in
Figs. 3–5. Consider Fig. 3: when Dmax is 250m and αu is 3.0, all consumer
agents choose unlicensed spectrum when secondary use is not permitted. With
secondary use, the results show that 12% of consumers choose secondary use.
Here, the utility and cost of exercising the secondary use option outweighs the
utility of using the unlicensed spectrum. This outcome implies that secondary
use is a viable alternative for spectrum access when an exclusive license is
considered to be too expensive. The percentage of secondary use is also higher
when αu is increased to 6.0, as expected. The difference between αu of 6.0
and 9.0 is less noticeable because agents who are suffering interference in the
unlicensed band have already chosen secondary use.
The amount of secondary use also increases with the maximum coverage.
As the coverage increases, consumer agents are more likely to encounter
interference from other agents using the unlicensed spectrum. Therefore, some
of them switch to secondary use as an alternative to the crowded unlicensed
band and the expensive exclusive license.
The results also show that when the secondary use option is introduced, the
demand for exclusive licenses is completely eliminated except for one case. In
this case (NC = 5, Dmax = 1000, and αu = 9.0), the percentages of exclusive
license and secondary use are 10.67% and 69.33%, respectively. These results
are the consequence of opportunism and small numbers bargaining [16]. Since
the number of consumers is only five and each consumer has the potential to
behave opportunistically, there is insufficient competition to drive secondary
use transactions. The trace data confirms that exactly one consumer agent can
occupy the unlicensed band with acceptable QoS. The other four only select
secondary use in some runs or only use exclusive licenses in other runs. In the
runs in which all four consumers chose exclusive licenses, the data reveals that
providers suffer interference from the opportunistic consumers. As a result,
they elect not to participate in secondary use by choosing a high value of degree
of control (dp). The average dp in these runs is greater than 0.95. Hence, the
four consumers have no choice but to use exclusive licenses. This situation does
not occur when the number of consumers is higher, as in Figs. 4 and 5.
Another point of interest is the percentage of unlicensed spectrum use when
secondary use is allowed. At Dmax of 1000 m, Fig. 5 shows that the percentage
of unlicensed spectrum is higher than without secondary use. In such scenarios,
where a large number of consumers have strict QoS requirements and the
coverage is also large, the unlicensed spectrum becomes over-saturated due
to high contention for the shared spectrum resources. Without the secondary
use option, this tragedy of the commons renders the unlicensed band unusable.
As a result, unlicensed use drops to 0.53% at αu of 6.0 and down to 0% at αu of
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9.0. On the other hand, when secondary use is introduced, some consumers opt
for secondary use, making others experience less contention for the unlicensed
spectrum. Thus, the unlicensed band becomes usable again. In this case, the
occupant of the unlicensed spectrum is often the consumer agent who is the
first mover into the unlicensed band (which raises interesting political economy
questions that are outside the scope of this paper).
These experiments demonstrate that the agent-based model can produce
outcomes corresponding to what might be expected in real-world spectrum
use. Unlicensed spectrum can accommodate a limited number of spectrum
users without causing excessive interference. In addition, spectrum users
whose application requires a large geographical coverage or demand a high-
level QoS tend to acquire exclusive licenses for spectrum access. Finally, the
introduction of secondary use allows a portion of consumers who cannot
afford exclusive licenses to become secondary users. Although we did not
perform welfare analysis, this outcome is suggestive of an increase in overall
welfare because both primary users (who now profit from otherwise unutilized
spectrum) and secondary users (who now incur lower costs to provide the same
service) are better off.
3.2 Feasible regions of secondary spectrum markets
In this set of experiments, we study the feasibility of the secondary spectrum
market in terms of the number of participants. This can be taken as one
measure of market thickness [11]. We perform experiments on the number
of consumer (NC) and provider (NP) agents and measure the percentage
of consumers selecting secondary use as the spectrum access option in each
experiment.
Figure 6 presents the results of percentage of secondary use for different
numbers of consumers and providers in the environment. The figure shows
that secondary use increases as the number of consumers and providers
Fig. 6 Percentage of secondary use vs. number of consumer and provider agents
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increases. With a small number of providers, there is a lack of viable com-
petition. Thus, these providers enjoy monopoly advantages. They can charge
the most profitable price that the consumers would accept (i.e., near or at
consumer’s reservation price). A small number of providers also limit the
amount of spectrum available for secondary use. In addition to this, a small
number of participants, whether they are consumers or providers, can engage
in opportunistic behaviors and result in interference among agents without
significant consequence. This is in contrast to the situation where there is a
large number of participants. As Williamson [16] observed: “...rivalry among
large numbers of bidders will render opportunistic inclinations ineffectual.
Parties who attempt to secure gains by strategic posturing will find that such
behavior is nonviable.” As a result, consumers may find the secondary use
option undesirable when the number of participants in secondary use is low.
Figure 7 is a contour plot of the percentage of secondary use in Fig. 6.
The contour lines demonstrate that consumer agents are taking advantage of
secondary use at a 5% level, even if there are a small number of consumers
in the environment (NC = 3). However, the 5% secondary use only emerged
when there were at least seven provider agents in the environment. At NC = 9,
the secondary use reached a 20% level with NP of at least 15. The percentage
did not go beyond 20% because the unlicensed spectrum can accommodate
the other 80% without harmful interference. As the number of consumers
increases, the percentage of secondary use becomes higher because of the
congestion in the unlicensed band. The higher percentage also requires a
higher number of providers in the environment. For example, secondary use
can reach a 30% level when there are at least 15 consumers and 15 providers.
Fig. 7 Contour lines of the percentage of secondary use
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Fig. 8 Percentage of unlicensed use vs. number of consumer and provider agents
Figures 8 and 9 display the results of the other two spectrum access
options, unlicensed spectrum and exclusive license, respectively. The results
of unlicensed spectrum usage show that a small number of consumers (i.e.,
NC = 1 and 3) select the unlicensed spectrum on average more than 90%
of the time because they can coexist without interference. As NC increases,
the unlicensed spectrum gets crowded and the effects of interference starts
to outweigh the zero price, so consumer agents seek other alternatives. From
Fig. 8, the deviation from unlicensed spectrum (i.e., the percentage drops)
occurs in two cases: (1) when the number of consumers and providers increases
or; (2) when only the number of consumers increases.
The first case can be explained by comparing Fig. 8 to Fig. 6. The increases
in NC and NP result in a higher percentage of secondary use while unlicensed
spectrum usage is reduced. The drop in the percentage of unlicensed usage
Fig. 9 Percentage of exclusive license use vs. number of consumer and provider agents
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is particularly noticeable when NP ≥ 9. Similarly, a comparison of Fig. 8 and
Fig. 9 describes the second case. The increase in NC alone when the number
of providers is low (i.e., less than nine in most cases) leads to an increasing
use of exclusive licenses. This outcome derives from two factors: (1) the
unlicensed spectrum is crowded resulting in interference among users and;
(2) secondary use is undesirable due to a small number of providers. The
data shows that consumers start using exclusive licenses from NC = 5. The
percentage increases noticeably when NC ≥ 11 and reaches as high as 9.82%
at NC = 19.
To evaluate the significance of these qualitative conclusions, we performed
statistical testing using multiple regression analysis, with the percentage of
secondary use as a dependent variable and the number of consumers (NC) and
the number of providers (NP) as the independent variables. Table 1 presents
two regression models. Model 1 uses NC and NP as independent variables
without considering the interaction effect. The result shows that both NC and
NP have a significant effect on the percentage of secondary use. The R2 value
for this model is .452. Once we incorporate the interaction term, NC × NP,
into the regression, Model 2 achieves a higher R2 of .567. From Table 1, the
regression equation for Model 2 is
Percentage of secondary use = 2.235 − 0.602NC + 0.136NC NP
= 2.235 + (−0.602 + 0.136NP)NC (14)
Both NC and NC × NP are significant in this model, while NP is not significant.
Since the dependent variable measures the choices of consumers, the change
in NP alone does not affect the percentage of secondary use. However, the
increases in both NC and NP result in a higher percentage of secondary use,
which confirms our analysis of Figs. 6–9. The number of consumers alone also
significantly influences the secondary use because the capacity and interference
effects in the unlicensed spectrum varies with the number of consumers. The
Table 1 Regression analysis of percentage of secondary use on number of consumers and
providers
Variable Model 1 Model 2
b Beta b Beta
NC .754∗∗∗ .327 −.602∗∗∗ −.261
(.031) (.056)
NP 1.357∗∗∗ .588 .000 .000
(.031) (.056)
NC × NP .136∗∗∗ .898
(.005)
Constant −11.326 2.235
Adjusted R2 .452 .567
N = 3000; b = unstandardized regression coefficient with standard error in parentheses; Beta =
standardized regression coefficient
∗ p ≤ .05, ∗∗ p ≤ .01, ∗∗∗ p ≤ .001
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regression in Eq. 14 shows that the increase in NC will produce a higher
percentage of secondary use (i.e., the coefficient of NC will become positive)
when NP is at least five.
In summary, the statistical analysis confirms our previous conclusion that
the secondary use of spectrum only emerges when there are a large number of
participants.
4 Conclusion
Increased demand for spectrum has caused regulators to consider a variety of
strategies to improve access to spectrum. This has included auctioning licenses
for more spectrum, seeking approaches to spectrum trading and increasing
unlicensed spectrum. Simultaneously, many countries are seeking ways of
stimulating innovation in wireless devices. This has led to new technologies,
such as UWB, and policies, such as “open access” (see, for instance, Wilkie
[28]), which open markets. It is far from clear which approach (or portfolio of
approaches) will meet social goals (see, for example, [8, 9]).
Beyond limited cases, such as MVNOs, policymakers have no concrete
information about what the consequences of changes in spectrum policy might
be, especially when new mechanisms, such as market-based secondary use, are
introduced. Researchers have risen to the occasion to provide some advice
(see, for instance Rodriguez [15]). We set out to build a platform that enables
researchers to understand the effects of complex user behavior in markets
(such as secondary use) that have not previously existed. The purpose of this
paper is to describe this agent-based computational economics (ACE) model
in conjunction with TCE which we optimized to study the secondary use of
radio spectrum.
In this application of the ACE model, we study the effect of secondary use
as a new spectrum access option. The results presented here show that the
secondary use is a viable alternative for spectrum users who find the exclusive
licenses too expensive or the unlicensed band too crowded. The fact that the
main results of this paper are intuitively satisfying is a validation of the model
that we developed.
It should be noted that auction-based secondary use only emerges when
there is sufficient market thickness. We have not yet studied the lower bound
of market thickness, or liquidity, which will be necessary for markets to
function. This condition creates a competitive market force to drive secondary
use transactions and suppresses opportunistic behaviors of the secondary use
participants.
These results have some practical significance. We have seen liberalization
in primary markets for spectrum (that is, initial assignment through auctions),
but we have yet to see a viable secondary market. This secondary market is
critical both for innovation and for encouraging license holders to continu-
ally evaluate the choice between investments spectrum and technology. This
research provides a first step toward understanding what a viable spectrum
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market might look like, even if it is focused specifically on the question
of secondary use. Clearly, the scope of the network (i.e., cell radius) is an
important factor for considering which approach to take. Also critical is the
market structure of spectrum holders.
Forthcoming papers will report on additional results from this model.
Furthermore, we are in the process of extending this model to examine not
just secondary use but also spectrum markets that could include permanent
transfers of licenses between users. The questions of interest in this extended
model include examining the impact of different market forms, emergence
of brokers and band managers, minimum levels of liquidity for effective
operation of spectrum markets and the emergence of derivatives.
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